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THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AND PRIVATE
LANDOWNER INCENTIVES
JEFFREY A. MICHAEL
Abstract: While intended to increase the habitat available to endangered species, the restrictions of the Endangered Species Act
(ESA) increase the costs of harboring an endangered species to private landowners and create incentives for private landowners
to reduce habitat. This paper illustrates the incentive for habitat destruction with a simple model of private land use under
the ESA, and uses it to predict the effects of changes in policy or biological conditions on private landowner incentives. Many
anecdotal accounts and recent empirical research support the predictions of the model. Because of the ESA’s perverse incentives,
many have proposed replacing the punitive regulations of the ESA with positive incentives for habitat creation, including takings
compensation, negligence compensation rules, tradable development rights, and land purchase programs. The paper concludes
by reviewing economic analysis of these proposals’ effectiveness.
Key words: Endangered Species Act, incentives, private property.

In 1973, the Endangered Species Act (ESA) passed
with near unanimous support in both the House and the
Senate. Recent attempts at reauthorization have been
much more contentious. In fact, Congress has failed to
reauthorize or amend the bill since it last expired in
1992. The ESA has been renewed on an annual basis
since 1992, as the debate over revision and reauthorization continues to drag on. Several environmental
groups are strongly opposed to any significant revisions
to what some say is the nation’s toughest environmental
law. Opponents of the current ESA argue that the act
requires a few private landowners to provide a benefit
to the public (endangered species habitat), while private
landowners bear all of the costs (restrictions on land use
and development).
The popularity and vast regulatory power of the
ESA are important statements of the value Americans
place on preventing the extinction of plants and animals, yet the law creates incentives for certain private
landowners to take actions that harm endangered species recovery. To avoid costly land use regulations, landowners may engage in preemptive habitat destruction of
currently unoccupied but potential endangered species
habitat, conceal or hinder the collection of information
about endangered species on their property, or even
kill endangered species (commonly known as “shoot,
shovel, and shut-up”). For simplicity, this paper primarily focuses on preemptive habitat destruction. The next
section provides background on the ESA and is followed
by a simple land use decision model that illustrates
the habitat destruction incentive. This is followed by
anecdotal and scientific evidence of habitat destruction,
and a discussion of the economics of compensating
private landowners for providing endangered species
habitat.

BACKGROUND
The 1973 Endangered Species Act is the broadest
and most powerful law in a century-old history of protecting fish, wildlife, and plants through national legislation. Two weaker laws, the 1966 Endangered Species
Preservation Act and the 1969 Endangered Species Conservation Act, preceded the ESA. These laws provided
a limited amount of money for the purchase of endangered species habitat as reserves and required the Secretary of Interior to publish a list of endangered animal
species. They also prohibited taking endangered species
on federal wildlife refuges and required federal agencies
to consider the impacts of their actions on endangered
species “to the extent practicable.” It was not until the
1973 ESA that federal law required endangered species
conservation on private lands.
The key provisions of the ESA for private landowners are found in Section 9. These provisions made it
unlawful to take any endangered or threatened species
on both public and private lands. Section 3 defined
“take” to mean “harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot,
wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect.” In 1975, the Secretary of Interior clarified the broad definition of “take” by
defining “harm” as:
“An act or omission which actually injures
or kills wildlife, including acts which annoy
it to such an extent as to significantly disrupt essential behavioral patterns, which
include, but are not limited to, breeding,
feeding, or sheltering; significant environmental modification or degradation which
has such effects is included within the
meaning of “harm.”
There have been several judicial rulings regarding the
takings prohibitions of Section 9. In the most important
Section 9 case, Babbitt v. Sweet Home Communities
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for a Greater Oregon (1995), the Supreme Court overturned a lower court’s decision and upheld the broad
definition of “take” that includes habitat alteration.
Congress passed amendments to the ESA in 1978,
1982, and 1988. The 1978 amendments set up a formal
process for exemptions to the requirements of federal
agencies in section 7 and were prompted by the famous
snail darter case (TVA v. Hill 437 U.S. 153 (1978)) in
which construction was stopped on a nearly completed
federal dam to save habitat for an endangered minnow.
The 1982 amendments required listing solely on biological grounds, prohibiting economic factors from being
considered in the listing process, and extended taking
prohibitions to endangered and threatened plants on
federal lands. Of most importance to private landowners, the 1982 amendments also allowed incidental
taking of an endangered species if a Habitat Conservation Plan (HCP) was approved by the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service (FWS) that provided mitigation for the
takings. Infrequently used for over a decade, HCPs have
become a focal point of recent ESA enforcement on
private lands. The 1988 amendments increased civil and
criminal penalties for ESA violations, and protected species that were proposed but not yet listed.
Since the last reauthorization of the ESA expired
in 1992, Congress has simply appropriated funds on
an annual basis to keep the ESA in force. Dozens of
reauthorization bills have been proposed in both houses
of Congress, but none of the bills have made it to the
floor of the House or Senate for a vote. In general,
the reauthorization bills sponsored by supporters of the
ESA contain few changes to the current law, while bills
sponsored by ESA opponents generally contain combinations of several reforms: peer-review, no surprises,
and takings compensation. Peer-review would increase
the rigor of scientific review before a species is listed.
Several species have been removed from the ESA after
subsequent biological studies have determined that the
species was never endangered (Mann and Plummer
1995), and the goal of peer-review is to stop these
mistakes. Critics of peer review believe the provisions
are only an attempt to weaken the efficacy of the ESA
by slowing down the listing process. A no surprises
clause would prohibit the FWS from adding any landuse restrictions or financial burdens on a landowner
with an approved habitat conservation plan. Many
HCPs already include a no surprises clause, but this
change would automatically make it a part of all
HCPs. In proposed reauthorization bills, takings compensation usually takes the form of mandating full compensation whenever ESA regulations reduce property
values beyond a threshold, usually a 20 to 33% reduction in property values. As discussed later in the paper,
economists generally support some type of landowner
compensation but most do not support the full compen-
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sation beyond a threshold rule that is the standard in
reauthorization bills requiring private landowner compensation (Brown and Shogren 1998, Innes, et al. 1998).
HR 3160 (The Common Sense Protections for
Endangered Species Act) is currently the leading reauthorization bill in the 106th Congress. Similar to Senate
Bill 1180, the leading reauthorization bill in the 105th
Congress that failed to pass despite some bipartisan
support, HR 3160 requires peer review in the listing
process, forces FWS to consider economic and social
impacts of recovery plans, requires no surprises policies
in HCPs, and provides small grants to landowners for
habitat conservation. A companion bill, HR 1142 (Landowners Equal Treatment Act), would provide compensation to landowners for whom ESA regulation reduced
property values over 25%. HR 960 (Endangered Species
Recovery Act) is an alternative bill supported by much
of the environmental community that provides estate
tax deferral to those who agree to endangered species
conservation agreements on their inherited property
but offers few other changes affecting private landowners.
A MODEL OF THE HABITAT DESTRUCTION
INCENTIVE
A simple decision tree model (Fig. 1) can be used
to illustrate private landowner incentives under the ESA.
The model is not a comprehensive model of the ESA but
rather a model focused on the basic incentives facing
a landowner whose land is potential habitat for a currently listed species. The preemptive development decision is illustrated using a 2-period model with nature
and 2 agents – a landowner (L) and a government
agency enforcing the ESA, the FWS. Initially, the land
harbors no endangered species, but the land is potential
habitat for an endangered species. The land’s value as
habitat (to the species) depends on the landowner’s
behavior.
Fig. 1 illustrates the decision-making timeline.
The landowner can choose to maintain (m) or destroy
(d) potential habitat in period 1. Destroying habitat has
a one-time cost (CD ) and generates benefits (BD ) from
development such as timber harvest. CD is the cost of
developing early, for example, harvesting timber before
it has reached the landowner’s optimal harvest age.
Nature (N) moves after the landowner and determines
the population levels of an endangered species, which
depends on the land use choice made in period 1. If
the habitat is destroyed, the probability that the endangered species inhabits the land is zero. If the habitat is
maintained, there is a probability (δ) that a population
of the species will inhabit the land because of migration
from nearby populations.
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Fig. 1. Decision tree for landowner under the ESA.

If the habitat is maintained and becomes populated with an endangered species (the lowest branch in
Fig. 1), the FWS will detect the presence of an existing
endangered species in period 2 with probability (δ). If
FWS detects an endangered species, it regulates land
use (under section 9) so that habitat cannot be altered.
Because FWS detection depends on the probability an
endangered species inhabits the land, the probability of
the ESA being in force is, assuming independent events,
δδ< 1 and the probability that the ESA will not be in
force is (1-δδ) <1. If the ESA is in force, the firm loses all
benefits from development in period 2 (BD = 0 in period
2) but may earn a smaller amount of benefits from an
alternative land use (BA < BD ) that does not harm the
endangered species habitat. If, however, L waits until
period 2 to develop, he faces no costs of development
(CD = 0). In the absence of the ESA, it is clear that the
optimal time to develop is in period 2 to avoid the extra
costs of developing in period 1.
The landowner chooses his or her action in
period 1, develop or maintain habitat, in order to maximize the expected value of the land. Thus, the landowner will choose to destroy the habitat as long as the
expected value of early development exceeds that of
waiting, or:
[BD -CD] > (1-δδ)BD + ( δδ)BA
(1)
The decision to destroy or maintain habitat will
depend on the value of these parameters and leads to
several straightforward predictions. First, increases in
the probability that an endangered species will inhabit
the land (δ) will increase the probability of preemptive
habitat destruction. In other words, the habitat that
is most important to the recovery of the endangered
species is the most likely to be developed. Second,
increases in the probability that the FWS will detect a

listed species (δ) will lead to more habitat destruction.
This probability could increase because of conditions
(e.g., specific to a location) that reduce detection costs
or because of increases in detection and enforcement
resources for FWS. Thus, the increased enforcement
budgets called for by ESA supporters would lead to
more habitat destruction on private lands. Third, as
the relative value of development (BD/BA) increases,
habitat destruction is more likely. Strengthening the critical habitat requirements for a particular species would
decrease BA and thus increase the incentive for habitat
destruction. Recent enforcement changes that rely more
on HCPs or a change in policy to include some type of
landowner compensation increase BA and reduce habitat
destruction. Finally, when the costs of development (CD)
are low, preemption is more likely. These costs could be
low if simple practices like grazing or plowing are sufficient to destroy habitat. These costs are also low when
a species is tied to well-defined and narrow habitat type,
such as the red-cockaded woodpecker (RCW), the spotted owl, and the golden-cheeked warbler. Wolves and
bald eagles, for example, have much less well-defined
habitat requirements and successful preemption would
be relatively costly.
EVIDENCE OF HABITAT DESTRUCTION ON
PRIVATE LANDS
Anecdotal evidence of preemptive habitat
destruction has been building for a variety of species
from a variety of sources, including journalists, biologists, government officials, economists, lawyers, and
environmentalists (e.g., Dolan 1992, Mann and Plummer
1995, Kennedy et al. 1996, Wilcove et al. 1996, Stroup
1997, Thompson 1997, Epstein 1997, Ruhl 1998). Perhaps the most famous reported case is that of North Car31
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olina landowner Ben Cone, who dramatically increased
his harvest of old growth pine in response to potential
ESA regulations (Stroup 1997). In 1991, the FWS
restricted Cone from harvesting timber on 1,500 acres
of his 7,200-acre property to protect 12 colonies of the
endangered RCW. A consultant estimated the market
value of timber on the 1,500 acres to be US$2 million
(roughly US$1,300 per acre). In response, Cone proceeded to clear-cut potential woodpecker habitat on
nearby but currently unregulated acres. Rather than
waiting to cut trees at age 80, he cut them at age
40 before they were prime RCW nesting habitat. Cone
also sent a letter to his neighbors describing the situation, and at least one soon began clear-cutting his
pine stands. In Texas, Mann and Plummer (1995) report
habitat destruction for the golden-cheeked warbler and
Ruhl (1998) reports the same for the black-capped vireo.
Gidari (1994) finds evidence of clear-cutting in the
Pacific Northwest in order to avoid logging restrictions
designed to protect the northern spotted owl. Dolan
(1992) and Seasholes (1997) find less-known cases in
California (where development values are high) and
elsewhere around the country. The National Association
of Home Builders actually advises preemption in its
Developers Guide to Endangered Species Regulation
(1996, p. 109; cited in Bean 1998, p. 10706),
“The highest level of assurance that a property owner will not face an ESA issue is to
maintain the property in a condition such
that protected species cannot occupy the
property . . . This is referred to as the
‘scorched earth’ technique.”
This anecdotal evidence is further supported by a
recent scientific study investigating the timber harvest
choices of landowners in areas of North Carolina that
are home to the red-cockaded woodpecker. Lueck and
Michael (2000) use data on over 1,000 individual forest
plots from the U.S. Forest Service’s Forest Inventory and
Analysis and the results of a 1997-98 survey of over 400
private landowners to test the hypothesis that the closer
a landowner is to known populations of RCWs, the more
likely the landowner will take action to destroy the
habitat for RCWs, primarily by “prematurely” cutting
their pine forest. By preventing the establishment of
an old growth pine stand, landowners can insure that
RCWs do not inhabit their land and avoid ESA regulations that limit or prohibit timber harvest activity. Data
from the Nature Conservancy’s Natural Heritage Program on RCW colony location was used to construct
various measures of the probability that a forest plot
will become inhabited by RCWs. Probit regressions estimate the probability that a plot is harvested and ordinary least squares regressions (corrected for harvest
selection bias) estimate the age at which a plot is harvested. After accounting for economic conditions and
landowner characteristics, Lueck and Michael (2000)

32

find that increases in the proximity of a plot to RCWs
increases the probability that the plot will be harvested
and decreases the age at which the forest is harvested.
Specifically, a given forest plot is about 30% more likely
to be harvested when located in an area with large
numbers of RCWs, and the age of the stand at harvest is
predicted to be 39 years compared to 46 years in an area
with low numbers of RCWs.
Lueck and Michael (2000) use these results to
estimate the reduction in pine forest acreage suitable for
RCWs between 1984 and 1990. They find that between
12,253 and 69,359 additional acres of mature pine were
harvested in North Carolina in order to avoid potential
ESA regulations. In the 5-county Sandhills region alone,
where RCWs are most populous, and an area targeted
by the FWS for recovery, the preemption acreage ranges
from 6,634 to 29,927. Looking more closely at the Sandhills region, the preempted habitat acreage would be
sufficient to support between 33 and 150 colonies of
RCWs, assuming a typical habitat of 200 acres per RCW
colony. Considering that only 70 colonies of RCWs can
be found on private lands in this region (Campbell
1998), it appears that the ESA led to the destruction
of as much habitat as it protected around private-land
colonies.
EFFICIENT COMPENSATION OF PRIVATE
LANDOWNERS
A number of theoretical papers address the issues
of takings, compensation and private landowner incentives under the ESA (Miceli and Segerson 1996, Innis
1997, Polasky et al. 1997, Smith and Shogren 1997,
Stroup 1997, Brown and Shogren 1998, Innes et al. 1998,
Polasky and Doremus 1998, Innes 2000), and other
types of government regulation (Blume et al. 1984). In
general, the papers specify game theoretic models of
private landowner and government regulator behavior
with the objective of deriving the optimal compensation
level to private landowners that eliminates the incentive
for preemptive habitat destruction and concealing information from regulators, and results in a socially efficient
level of endangered species conservation. The compensation rules evaluated include full compensation for
lost private use values (the type of takings compensation proposed in recent legislation), payment equal to
the public conservation value of the habitat preserved,
negligence compensation rules, tradable development
rights, and government purchases of desired habitat
under eminent domain.
Standard takings compensation (full payment of
the loss in private use value in the event of endangered
species regulation) is inefficient for 2 reasons. First, it
fails to reward landowners for improvements in the
public conservation value. Second, it creates an incentive to overdevelop in some settings because landown-
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ers do not need to consider the public conservation
value of their land (Blume et al. 1984). An efficient
compensation scheme will cause a private landowner to
value each of their land use alternatives at the same level
as society. Under takings compensation, the landowner
receives the private use value whether they commit
the property to conservation or development purposes.
In addition to the overdevelopment incentive, takings
compensation invites contrived claims and would entail
large administrative and legal costs (Goldstein and
Watson 1997).
Private land-use incentives are fully aligned with
social benefits and costs when landowners are paid
the public conservation value of their land (pigouvian
compensation). Public conservation value includes both
the market and nonmarket value of all the conservation
benefits produced by the undeveloped land that are
received by someone other than the landowner. However, the efficient compensation scheme would be difficult to implement in practice because of the difficulty
in accurately quantifying the public conservation value
and the large sum of public funds necessary to pay it.
Although economists have made great advances in quantifying values for nonmarket goods such as endangered
species protection, nonmarket valuation techniques are
still controversial and determining nonmarket values for
individual properties would have high research costs.
Pigouvian compensation may also involve a greater budgetary cost than takings compensation. When considering the efficiency (deadweight) costs of raising these
funds through the tax system, the high budgetary outlays necessary for pigouvian compensation could substantially reduce the social efficiency of such a policy
(Innes et al. 1998).
An ideal system creates incentives similar to
pigouvian compensation at lower budgetary costs to
the government. Innes (2000) shows that this could
be achieved under a linear compensation rule that
penalizes landowners for higher private land values or
through the use of a negligence compensation rule.
Under a negligence compensation rule, landowners
with endangered species habitat receive positive compensation only if they take socially efficient actions
to protect the public conservation value of their land.
A negligence compensation rule reduces the overinvestment incentive of standard takings compensation,
because landowners will no longer undertake development solely for the purpose of eliciting greater amounts
of takings compensation.
The difference between takings compensation
and a negligence compensation rule can be illustrated
by considering a simple example of beachfront property
where conservation as endangered species habitat has
a higher social value than development. Under takings
compensation, the landowner may have an incentive to

wastefully enhance the property’s development value,
for example by building a road. By increasing the development value, the landowner buttresses his or her takings claim and increases the chance that the claim
exceeds the value loss thresholds (e.g., 25%, 33%) specified in the takings law. Under a negligence compensation rule, the landowner triggers compensation by
taking actions that enhance the property’s conservation
value, such as protecting or planting dune grass. In
practice, the difficulty of implementing such a system is
determining whether or not a landowner has efficiently
protected the property’s public use value.
Extensions to the basic optimal compensation
models include consideration of multi-parcel, spatial
issues in compensation rules, tradable development permits, and asymmetric information between regulators
and landowners. Incorporating spatial issues makes it
efficient to offer higher payments to adjacent landowners providing endangered species habitat (Smith and
Shogren 1997) because clusters of habitat are potentially
more valuable to the long-term recovery of species. A
policy of tradable development rights improves economic efficiency with zero government outlay because
those who buy the permits compensate those who sell
development permits and give up their property for
public use as endangered species habitat (Kennedy et
al. 1996). By lowering the cost of endangered species
to development-minded landowners, tradable development rights reduce but do not eliminate the incentive
for preemptive habitat destruction. Habitat destruction
incentives are reduced because development-minded
landowners with endangered species can develop their
property if they purchase permits from a landowner
that will mitigate the resulting habitat loss. If the permits have high prices, endangered species will still be
a costly liability for landowners who may still choose
to destroy habitat in order to protect against the need
to purchase development permits. Low permit prices
reduce or eliminate the incentive for preemptive habitat
destruction but do not provide much of an incentive
for habitat creation or enhancement. There are also
significant administrative difficulties in such a system
for endangered plant and wildlife habitat.
Asymmetric information could involve landowners withholding biological information from the regulator (Polasky and Doremus 1998) or withholding information about their private conservation values, and thus
their willingness to accept lower payments to provide
habitat (Innes et al. 1998). Stroup (1997) argues that
a market approach with a budget constraint and compensation paid in the form of land and easement purchases or habitat rental will result in the government
seeking out low-cost providers of habitat and the lowcost producers coming forward. Low-cost producers of
endangered species habitat are those with high private
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conservation values so that habitat conservation has a
relatively small impact on the land’s private use value.
These landowners may be willing to protect habitat for
far less than full compensation and would make up
the lower portion of supply curve for endangered species habitat where “willingness to accept payment for
habitat protection” is the vertical axis and “habitat acres
preserved” is the horizontal axis.
A straightforward alternative to the landowner
compensation rules discussed above is full government
acquisition of habitat for the creation of biodiversity
protection reserves. Unlike the compensation rules, the
acquisition of biodiversity reserves could be pursued as
a supplement to the current ESA and would not necessarily change the way private landowners are regulated
under the ESA. Ando et al. (1998) used data on the
location of endangered species and average county land
values in the U.S. To solve a budget constrained siteselection problem that maximized the number of endangered species covered by reserves. Their results showed
that optimal reserve locations were concentrated in the
southwestern states such as Arizona, Nevada, and New
Mexico. Polasky et al. (1999) have solved a similar, more
detailed problem for selecting forest reserve sites in
Oregon. Because these studies assume the outright purchase of properties for a biodiversity reserve, the cost
of adding acreage to a reserve is the price of land.
An alternative strategy is the purchase of conservation
easements, where the definition of cost is the difference
between the unregulated market value of the land and
the value of alternative land uses that preserve adequate
habitat. For example RCW can thrive on properties used
for quail hunting, golf courses, pine straw raking, and
residential development even though the most valuable
use of most properties, short rotation timber production, does not provide suitable habitat. Solving the lowcost easement purchase problem would likely result in
a different distribution of reserves and is a question
that merits further research. A problem with the reserve
purchase approach is that assembling large reserves
will ultimately require the government to acquire some
properties via eminent domain rather than a voluntary
sale with individual landowners. The involuntary nature
of such a program could lead to political problems and
potentially create new incentive problems despite full
compensation.
Another alternative to private landowner compensation recognizes that the key to the ESA’s perverse
incentives is the ability of private landowners to manipulate the conservation value or development value of
their land through their management choices. Polasky
et al. (1997, pp. 72-73) state:
“In order to effectively limit the ability of
landowners to manipulate outcomes, regulatory decisions must be based on factors
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that are difficult for landowners to manipulate. In the species conservation context,
regulators might assess the land’s potential
suitability for listed species rather than the
current presence or absence of those species. Suitability might be judged on the
basis of soil type, topography, and climate
conditions – factors largely outside landowners’ control.”
The location of a property with respect to species
location, public lands, and existing habitat is another
important criteria that could be used to judge suitability.
Of course, regulating land based on suitability rather
than the actual presence of endangered species may
be politically difficult. However, such criteria could be
effective if policy changed to embrace market mechanisms such as land and easement purchases, and rental
payments in place of the current regulatory approach.
CONCLUSION
Current reauthorization proposals for the ESA
only recommend limited or inefficient compensation for
private landowners such as standard takings compensation, estate tax credits, and cost sharing for habitat
improvements. No legislation has proposed payments
that are linked to public conservation value, utilize negligence rules, or provide payments at any level less
than full takings compensation. In addition, no proposals include funds for simple land acquisition despite
the fact that funding for public purchase of properties
and conservation easements for other environmental
reasons are very popular. Many states (e.g., Colorado,
Maryland) have authorized millions of dollars for land
and easement acquisition and it appears the proposed
Lands Legacy program will authorize several hundred
million (if not more than a billion) dollars in federal
funds for similar purposes. Ultimately, endangered species policy on private lands must address the fact that
landowners can affect the public conservation value of
their land through their management choices. Because
of this, traditional regulatory approaches such as the
current ESA and policies that punish landowners for
harm are ineffective. In this setting, where public use
values are in private hands, positive compensation is
necessary for social efficiency. The challenge for future
economic research is to consider how theoretical derivations of efficient, low-cost compensation rules can be
made simple and easy to implement in practice.
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